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COMPUTING NORMAL FORM PERFECT EQUILIBRIA
FOR EXTENSIVE TWO-PERSON GAMES
By Bernhard von Stengel, Antoon van den Elzen,
and Dolf Talman1
July 31, 2000
This paper presents an algorithm for computing an equilibrium of an
extensive two-person game with perfect recall. The method is computationally
efficient by using the sequence form, whose size is proportional to the size of the
game tree. The equilibrium is traced on a piecewise linear path in the sequence
form strategy space from an arbitrary starting vector. If the starting vector
represents a pair of completely mixed strategies, then the equilibrium is normal
form perfect. Computational experiments compare the sequence form and the
reduced normal form, and show that only the sequence form is tractable for
larger games.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we present an algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium of a two-
person game in extensive form with perfect recall. The computed equilibrium is
normal form perfect. If the game has several equilibria, they can potentially be
found by varying the starting point of the algorithm. The method is fast since it
uses the compact “sequence form” of the extensive game (see the references below)
instead of its reduced normal form. It is simple because it is a version of Lemke’s
algorithm for linear complementarity problems. We have implemented it in exact
arithmetic, which guarantees numerical stability. Computational experiments show
that the number of pivoting steps of our algorithm to find an equilibrium is of the
same order as that of the simplex algorithm for linear programming applied to a
comparable zero-sum game. “Typical” games with several hundred nodes are solved
in less than a minute where it would be hopeless to use the reduced normal form.
Our method therefore puts much more complex games in computational reach, even
more so as computers get faster.
The algorithm is a synthesis of previous, partly independent work by the au-
thors and Daphne Koller and Nimrod Megiddo. For two-person games in normal
form, van den Elzen and Talman (1991, 1999) (see also van den Elzen, 1993) de-
scribed a complementary pivoting algorithm that traces a piecewise linear path from
a given starting vector to an equilibrium. If the starting vector is a completely mixed
strategy pair, then the computed path leads to a perfect equilibrium. The free choice
of the starting vector makes it possible to compute several equilibria if they exist.
This pivoting algorithm can be applied to an extensive game by converting it
to its normal form. Then, the variables are probabilities for pure strategies, each of
which is a combination of choices, one choice for each information set. The number
of strategies therefore increases exponentially with the number of information sets.
The number of information sets is typically proportional to the size of the game tree
(the number of tree nodes), so then the size of the normal form is exponential. Even
the reduced normal form (where strategies that differ only in choices at unreachable
information sets are identified) shows an exponential-type growth in that case. For
example, the games with N tree nodes studied in our computational experiments
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have on the order of 2
√
N reduced strategies rather than on the order of 2N unreduced
strategies, which nevertheless leads to an “explosion” in size. Each pivoting step
updates the entire linear system derived from the payoff matrices, which is very slow
for matrices of exponential size.
The sequence form of the extensive game (Romanovskii, 1962; von Stengel,
1996) is a strategic description where pure strategies are replaced by sequences of
choices that lead to a node of the game tree, so there are at most as many sequences
as there are nodes. The dimensions of the resulting matrix are proportional to the
game tree size. Each pivoting step applied to this system is therefore computationally
efficient. An algorithm is called computationally efficient if its asymptotic running
time is bounded by a polynomial in the input size. For the overall number of
pivoting steps, this is only an empirical observation. Our practical experiments
show that the number of pivoting steps to find an equilibrium is about the same as
the matrix dimension. The pivoting method, like the simplex algorithm for linear
programming, is not polynomial in theory (certain specifically constructed worst
cases take exponential time), but works well in practice.
Koller, Megiddo, and von Stengel (1996) applied the complementary pivoting
algorithm by Lemke (1965) to the sequence form. As before, each pivoting step
takes polynomial time, and the number of pivoting steps is empirically a polynomial
in the tree size. However, this algorithm finds only one equilibrium and it is not
certain whether this equilibrium is normal form perfect.
Here we show how to combine the (empirical) computational efficiency of the
algorithm of Koller, Megiddo, and von Stengel (1996) and the flexibility of the
algorithm of van den Elzen and Talman (1991). Our method is a variation of Lemke’s
algorithm and operates on the sequence form. It can be started anywhere to search
for more than one equilibrium. If the starting strategy vector is completely mixed,
the equilibrium found is normal form perfect. Equivalently, it is a Nash equilibrium
in undominated strategies since the game has two players (van Damme, 1987).
The key to our result is the new observation that the algorithm of van den
Elzen and Talman is equivalent to Lemke’s algorithm for a specific auxiliary vector.
This is readily applied to the sequence form, as described in Section 3 below. We
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then study the nature of the computed path. The path and the equilibrium found
have all properties of the normal form in a compact representation.
The implementation of our algorithm also resolves a number of technical diffi-
culties of degeneracy and numerical accuracy. Degeneracy is intrinsic for extensive
games, even with generic payoffs and when using the sequence form, since the prob-
abilities for the players’ behavior off the equilibrium path are underdetermined.
In order to avoid a well-known numerical instability of Lemke’s algorithm (Tomlin,
1978), we employ arbitrary precision arithmetic, and yet achieve good running times
due to the use of “integer pivoting”.
We also give a concise exposition of the sequence form in Section 2, and show,
more explicitly than in earlier publications, how it relates to the normal form via
equation (2.2). The sequence form defines an equilibrium problem where each play-
er’s strategy space is a polytope. Charnes (1953) described the solution of zero-sum
games that are constrained in this way. For a game in extensive form, Romanovskii
(1962) derived such a constrained matrix game which is equivalent to the sequence
form. Until recently, this publication was overlooked in the English-speaking com-
munity. Eaves (1973) applied Lemke’s algorithm to games which include polyhedral-
ly constrained bimatrix games, but with different parameters than we do. Dai and
Talman (1993) described an algorithm that corresponds to ours but requires simple
polyhedra as strategy spaces, which is not the case for the sequence form. Selten
(1988, pp. 226, 237ff) defined sequence form strategy spaces to exploit their linearity,
but not for computational purposes. Recent surveys on algorithms for computing
Nash equilibria are McKelvey and McLennan (1996) and von Stengel (2000).
The setup of the paper is as follows. Section 2 recalls the notion of the sequence
form, its derivation from the extensive game, and how its equilibria are the solutions
to a corresponding linear complementary problem. The algorithm is presented in
Section 3 and illustrated in Section 4 with an example. In Section 5 we prove that the
equilibrium found is normal form perfect if the starting strategy vector is completely
mixed, and note that the algorithm mimics the linear tracing procedure. Section 6
discusses the handling of degeneracy. In Section 7 we show that our method is
an instance of a homotopy, and mention how to find equilibria of negative index.
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Section 8 compares the method with other algorithms. In Section 9, we present
results of computational experiments.
2. The sequence form linear complementarity problem
We consider extensive two-person games, with conventions similar to von Stengel
(1996) and Koller, Megiddo, and von Stengel (1996). An extensive game is given by a
tree with a finite number of nodes, chance moves with positive probabilities, payoffs
to both players at the leaves (the terminal nodes), and information sets partitioning
the set of remaining decision nodes. The choices of a player at an information set
are denoted by labels of tree edges. For simplicity, labels corresponding to different
choices anywhere in the tree are distinct. On the unique path from the root to
a node of the tree, the labels denoting the choices of a particular player define a
sequence of choices for that player. We assume that both players have perfect recall.
By definition, this means that all nodes in an information set h of a player define the
same sequence σh of choices for that player. Under that assumption, each choice c
at h is the last choice of a unique sequence σhc. This defines all possible sequences
of a player except for the empty sequence ∅. The set of choices at an information
set h is denoted Ch. The set of information sets of player i is Hi, and the set of his
sequences is Si, so
Si = { ∅ } ∪ { σhc | h ∈ Hi, c ∈ Ch }.
The size of the extensive game is the amount of data needed to specify it. It is
proportional to the total number of nodes of the game tree. The number |Si| of
sequences of player i is 1 +
P
h∈Hi |Ch|, which is at most linear in the size of the
extensive game.
A behavior strategy β of player i is given by probabilities β(c) for his choices
c which fulfill β(c) ≥ 0 and Pc∈Ch β(c) = 1 for all h in Hi . This definition of β can






A pure strategy π of a player is a behavior strategy with π(c) ∈ {0, 1} for all
choices c. The set of pure strategies of player i is denoted Pi. Thus, π[σ] ∈ {0, 1}
for all sequences σ in Si. The pure strategies π with π[σ] = 1 are those “agreeing”
with σ by prescribing all the choices in σ, and arbitrary choices at the information
sets not touched by σ.
In the normal form of the extensive game, one considers pure strategies and
their probability mixtures. A mixed strategy µ of player i assigns a probability
µ(π) to every π in Pi . In the sequence form of the extensive game, one considers
the sequences of a player instead of his pure strategies. A randomized strategy of
player i is described by the realization probabilities of playing the sequences σ in Si.
For a behavior strategy β , these are obviously β[σ] as in (2.1). For a mixed strategy





For player 1, this defines a map x from S1 to IR by x(σ) = µ[σ] for σ in S1 which
we call the realization plan of µ or a realization plan for player 1. A realization
plan for player 2, similarly defined on S2 , is denoted y. The important properties of
realization plans are stated in the following two lemmas (Koller and Megiddo, 1992;
von Stengel, 1996).
Lemma 2.1: For player 1, x is the realization plan of a mixed strategy if and
only if x(σ) ≥ 0 for all σ ∈ S1 and
x(∅) = 1,X
c∈Ch
x(σhc) = x(σh), h ∈ H1. (2.3)
A realization plan y of player 2 is characterized analogously.
Proof: Equations (2.3) hold for the realization probabilities x(σ) = β[σ] for
a behavior strategy β and thus for every pure strategy π, and therefore for their
convex combinations in (2.2) with the probabilities µ(π).
To simplify notation, we write realization plans as vectors x = (xσ)σ∈S1 and
y = (yσ)σ∈S2 with sequences as subscripts. According to Lemma 2.1, these vectors
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are characterized by
x ≥ 0, Ex = e, y ≥ 0, Fy = f (2.4)
for suitable matrices E and F , and vectors e and f that are equal to (1, 0 . . . , 0)>,
where E and e have 1+ |H1| rows and F and f have 1+ |H2| rows; an example for
E , e, F , and f is given in (2.6) below. Inequalities like (2.4) hold componentwise
and 0 denotes a vector of zeroes. The number of information sets and therefore the
number of rows of E and F is at most linear in the size of the game tree.
Mixed strategies of a player are called realization equivalent (Kuhn, 1953) if
they define the same realization probabilities for all nodes of the tree given any
strategy of the other player.
Lemma 2.2: Two mixed strategies µ and µ0 of player i are realization equiv-
alent if and only if they have the same realization plan, that is, µ[σ] = µ0[σ] for all
σ ∈ Si.
Proof: Consider (2.2) as defining a linear map from IR|Pi| to IR|Si| that maps
the vector (µ(π))π∈Pi to (µ[σ])σ∈Si with the fixed coefficients π[σ], π ∈ Pi . Then
mixed strategies with the same image under this map are clearly realization equiv-
alent.
The linear map in the preceding proof maps the simplex of mixed strategies
of a player to the polytope of realization plans. These polytopes are characterized
by (2.4) as asserted by Lemma 2.1. They define the player’s strategy spaces in the
sequence form and are denoted by
X = { x | x ≥ 0, Ex = e }, Y = { y | y ≥ 0, Fy = f }. (2.5)
The vertices of X and Y are the players’ pure strategies up to realization equivalence,
which is the identification of pure strategies used in the reduced normal form of the
game (for generic payoffs).
Figure 2.1 shows an extensive game where the choices of player 1 and player 2




































































































































































Figure 2.1.–A two-person extensive game.
The sets of sequences are S1 = {∅, L, R,RS,RT} and S2 = {∅, a, b, c, d}. In the
constraints (2.4) we have
E =
⎡⎢⎣ 1−1 1 1
−1 1 1
⎤⎥⎦ , F =
⎡⎢⎣ 1−1 1 1
−1 1 1




Sequence form payoffs are defined for pairs of sequences whenever these lead
to a leaf, multiplied by the probabilities of chance moves on the path to the leaf.
This defines two sparse matrices A and B of dimension |S1| × |S2| for player 1 and
player 2, respectively. For the game in Figure 2.1, A and B are shown in Figure 2.2.
When the players use the realization plans x and y , the expected payoffs are x>Ay
for player 1 and x>By for player 2. These terms represent the sum over all leaves
of the payoffs at leaves multiplied by their realization probabilities.
Using linear programming duality, von Stengel (1996) showed that any Nash
equilibrium of the game is a pair (x, y) of realization plans so that there exist vectors






























Figure 2.2.–Sequence form payoff matrices A and B for the game in Figure 2.1.
Rows and columns correspond to the sequences of the players which
are marked at the side. Any sequence pair not leading to a leaf has
matrix entry zero, which is left blank.
x , y ≥ 0
Ex = e
Fy = f
r = E>u −Ay ≥ 0
s = F>v −B>x ≥ 0
(2.7)
and the complementarity condition
x>r = 0, y>s = 0 . (2.8)
The vectors u and v have dimension 1 + |H1| and 1 + |H2|, respectively, and are
unconstrained in sign. The nonnegative slack vectors r and s have dimension |S1|
and |S2|, respectively.
Conditions (2.7) and (2.8) define a linear complementarity problem or LCP. A
standard LCP is specified by an n× n matrix M and an n-vector b. The problem
is to find n-vectors z and w so that
z ≥ 0, w = b+Mz ≥ 0, z>w = 0 . (2.9)
The condition z>w = 0 states that the nonnegative vectors z = (z1, . . . , zn)> and
w = (w1, . . . , wn)
> are complementary, that is, at least one variable of each pair
(zi, wi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n is zero.
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The LCP defined by (2.7) and (2.8) is a more general mixed LCP (see Cottle,
Pang, and Stone, 1992, p. 29). Here z = (u, v, x, y)> and w = (0,0, r, s)> and
certain variables zi (the components of u and v) are unrestricted in sign and the
corresponding variable wi is always zero, so that z and w are also complementary.
3. The algorithm
Lemke (1965) described an algorithm for solving the LCP (2.9). It uses an additional
n-vector d, called covering vector , with a corresponding scalar variable z0 , and
computes with basic solutions to the augmented system
z ≥ 0, z0 ≥ 0, w = b+Mz + dz0 ≥ 0, z>w = 0 . (3.1)
At initialization, z0 has a positive value. The algorithm then performs a sequence of
complementary pivoting steps. At each step, one variable of a complementary pair
(zi, wi) leaves and then its complement enters the basis. In a mixed LCP, a variable
zi without sign restrictions never leaves the basis. The goal is that eventually z0
leaves the basis and then has value zero, so that the LCP is solved. Koller, Megiddo,
and von Stengel (1996) give a detailed exposition of Lemke’s algorithm and show
that it terminates for the LCP derived from the sequence form if d = (1, 1, . . . , 1)>.
We choose a covering vector d that is related to the starting point for our
computation. Let (p, q) be an arbitrary starting vector, that is, a pair of realization
plans for the two players, so that









We augment the mixed LCP with constraints (2.7) with d as in (3.3) and obtain
analogous to (3.1)
10
x , y , z0 ≥ 0
Ex + e z0 = e
Fy + f z0 = f
r = E>u − Ay − (Aq)z0 ≥ 0
s = F>v −B>x − (B>p)z0 ≥ 0
(3.4)
and the complementarity condition (2.8). An initial solution is given by z0 = 1,
x = 0, y = 0, and suitable vectors u and v so that E>u ≥ Aq and F>v ≥ B>p,
that is, r ≥ 0 and s ≥ 0.
Conditions (3.4) and (2.8) hold for all points on the piecewise linear path
computed by the algorithm. In the remainder of this section, we show that this
path induces a path in the product X × Y of the two strategy spaces defined in
(2.5), which begins at the starting vector (p, q) and ends at an equilibrium. The
points (x, y) on this path are derived from (x, y) in (3.4) as follows.
Lemma 3.1: For a solution (u, v, x, y, z0) to (3.4), let
x = x+ pz0, y = y + qz0 . (3.5)
Then x ∈ X , y ∈ Y , and x∅ = y∅ = 1− z0 ≥ 0.
Proof: Constraints (3.4) and (3.2) imply x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0, Ex = E(x + pz0) =
Ex+ (Ep)z0 = Ex+ ez0 = e, and similarly Fy = f . By (2.3) and (2.4), the first of
each of these equations reads x∅ + z0 = 1 and y∅ + z0 = 1, respectively.
By Lemma 3.1, any solution to (3.4) fulfills 0 ≤ z0 ≤ 1. The algorithm
terminates as soon as z0 = 0, so that x = x ∈ X and y = y ∈ Y and (x, y) is an
equilibrium. At intermittent steps of the computation with 0 < z0 < 1, the pair
(x, y) in (3.5) can be seen as a convex combination of a pair (x∗, y∗) of realization
plans and the starting pair (p, q) with weights 1− z0 and z0 , respectively. Namely,
let
x∗ = x · 1/(1− z0), y∗ = y · 1/(1− z0), (3.6)
so that x = x + pz0 = x
∗ (1 − z0) + p z0 and y = y + qz0 = y∗ (1 − z0) + q z0 . By
(3.4), Ex = e(1− z0) and Fy = f(1− z0), which implies x∗ ∈ X and y∗ ∈ Y . The
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positive components xσ and yσ of x and y are the same as the positive components
of x∗ and y∗ , up to scalar multiplication with 1− z0 . By the following lemma, these
represent best response sequences σ to the current pair (x, y) of realization plans.
Lemma 3.2: Let (u, v, x, y, z0) be a solution to (3.4) and (2.8) with z0 < 1,
and let x and y be as in (3.5), and x∗ and y∗ as in (3.6). Then (x∗, y∗) is a pair
of realization plans where x∗ is a best response to y and y∗ is a best response to x.
Proof: In the following, consider x and y as given in (3.5) and x∗ and y∗ as
in (3.6), but then allow to re-use the variables x and u. A realization plan x is a
best response to y if and only if it maximizes the expected payoff x>(Ay) subject
to Ex = e, x ≥ 0. The dual of this linear program (LP) is to find u minimizing
e>u subject to E>u ≥ Ay. Feasible solutions x and u to this primal-dual pair of
LPs are optimal if and only if they fulfill the complementary slackness condition
x>(E>u− Ay) = 0 . (3.7)
For x and u as part of the given solution to (3.4) and (2.8), all of these conditions
are fulfilled except for Ex = e. However, replacing x by x∗ does fulfill (3.7) and
Ex∗ = e, x∗ ≥ 0 since x∗ is a positive scalar multiple of x by (3.6). That is, x∗ is
indeed a best response to y . Similarly, y∗ in (3.6) is a best response to x.
In order to leave the starting vector (p, q), it is necessary to find solutions to
(3.4) and (2.8) where z0 < 1 is possible. This is the technical problem of a suitable
initialization of our algorithm. Whenever z0 decreases from one, usually several
components of x (and similarly of y) have to become simultaneously nonzero in the
equations Ex = e(1 − z0), which are the same homogeneous equations as in (2.3)
except for the first, nonhomogeneous equation x∅ = 1 − z0 which is different. The
initial solution x = 0, y = 0 does not show which components of x and y should be
increased. One of these components is the first entering variable, the others must
belong to the initial basis. In our implementation, we initialize Lemke’s algorithm
by starting it such that it automatically performs a sequence of degenerate pivoting
steps that bring all components of u and v and suitable components of x and y into
the basis, as shown in detail in our discussion paper (von Stengel, van den Elzen,
and Talman, 1996).
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For expository purposes, we explain an equivalent way of finding the initial
basis by linear programming, similarly to Kamiya and Talman (1990) and Dai and
Talman (1993). This initialization step is motivated by Lemma 3.2. Compute a
best response x∗ to q and a best response y∗ to p. That is, x∗ is a solution to the
LP: maximize x>(Aq) subject to Ex = e, x ≥ 0, and y∗ to the LP: maximize
(p>B)y subject to Fy = f , y ≥ 0. This yields also corresponding optimal dual
vectors u and v so that x∗>(E>u − Aq) = 0 and y∗>(F>v − B>p) = 0. We may
assume that x∗ and y∗ are basic solutions to these two LPs, for example as they are
computed by the simplex algorithm for linear programming. That is, an invertible
submatrix of each matrix E and F determines the respective basic components x∗σ
and y∗σ which may become positive, and determines uniquely u and v, respectively.
Then, the basis to start Lemke’s algorithm contains z0 , all components of u and v,
all but one of the variables xσ and yσ corresponding to the basic LP variables x
∗
σ
and y∗σ above (the missing one is the first entering variable), and the slack variables
rσ and sσ in r = E
>u − Aq and s = F>v − B>p for the other sequences σ. We
obtain the following procedure.
Algorithm 3.3: Consider an extensive game for two players with perfect
recall, and its sequence form with payoff matrices A and B and constraint matrices
E and F for player 1 and player 2, respectively. Choose a starting vector (p, q)
fulfilling (3.2). Construct the augmented mixed LCP with constraints (3.4) and
(2.8). Solve this LCP as follows.
(a) Find an initial basic solution with z0 = 1 where the basic variables are z0, all
components of u and v, all but one of the components of x and y representing
best response sequences against q and p, respectively, and slack variables rσ
and sσ for the nonoptimal sequences σ.
(b) Iterate by complementary pivoting steps applied to pairs (xσ, rσ) or (yσ, sσ) of
complementary variables.
(c) As soon as z0 becomes zero, let z0 leave the basis and pivot. Terminate. The
computed equilibrium is (x, y).
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Lemma 3.1 shows that in the course of the computation, the values of x, y,
and z0 determine always a pair (x, y) of realization plans and thus a path in the
product X×Y of the two strategy spaces. We are only interested in this path, since
the basic variables in u and v are uniquely determined.
It remains to show that the algorithm terminates. With the above interpreta-
tion, we can exclude ray termination, which may cause Lemke’s algorithm to fail,
because the path cannot leave the strategy space. Thus, the algorithm terminates
if the path is unique in the sense that no basis is revisited. This is achieved by a
systematic degeneracy resolution which we discuss in Section 6.
4. Illustration of the algorithm
We illustrate the computation for the game in Figure 2.1. The constraints for the
strategy spaces X and Y in (2.5) are given by (2.6). We denote the elements of X
and Y by x and y as in (3.5). Figure 4.1 shows X for the possible values of xL,
xRS , xRT . Figure 4.2 shows Y with the pairs ya, yb and yc, yd corresponding to the
vertical and horizontal coordinates of a square, respectively, since ya + yb = 1 and
yc+yd = 1. The redundant variables x∅ , xR , and y∅ are not shown since their value
is known, and they also have no payoff entry in Figure 2.2.
Each strategy space is subdivided into best response regions for the sequences
of the other player. In Figure 4.2, these are the sequences L, RS , RT of player 1,
which correspond to player 1’s pure strategies in the reduced normal form. In
Figure 4.1, X is partitioned twice, namely into regions where sequence a or b is
a best response of player 2, and independently into regions where c or d is a best
response. This multiple partition of X into best response regions results because a, b
and c, d are the choices at parallel information sets h and h0 where σh = σh0 . This
is also reflected in the structure of F and the complementary slackness condition for
the constraints F>v ≥ B>x, as explained in detail in von Stengel et al. (1996). In
effect, the four pure strategies of player 2 consisting of the choice pairs ha, ci, hb, ci,
ha, di, and hb, di appear both as vertices of the strategy space Y in Figure 4.2 and































































































































































Figure 4.1.–Strategy space X of player 1 for the sequence form of the game in
Figure 2.1, with best response sequences of player 2. Computation
steps are indicated by arrows or as underlined steps with no change
for player 1. The starting point p for player 1 is (pL, pRS, pRT ) =
(3/10, 7/20, 7/20).
We choose the starting vector (p, q) defined by
(pL, pRS, pRT ) = (3/10, 7/20, 7/20), (qa, qb, qc, qd) = (1/3, 2/3, 1/3, 2/3). (4.1)
In Figure 4.1 and 4.2, p and q are marked by a dot in the interior of each strategy
space. The unique best response sequence of player 1 to q is RS , and the unique
best response sequences of player 2 to p are b and c. Among the components of
x and y , the initial basic variables and the first entering variable in the system
(3.4) are therefore xRS , yb, and yc . The algorithm performs the following steps as





















































yc = 1 yd = 1
yd = 1
yb = 1 yb = 1





Figure 4.2.–Strategy space Y of player 2 for the sequence form of the game in
Figure 2.1, with best responses of player 1 and computation steps.
The starting point q for player 2 is (qa, qb, qc, qd) = (1/3, 2/3, 1/3, 2/3).
1. The first step is the line segment starting at (p, q) so that (x, y) in (3.5)
changes by decreasing z0 from one and increasing at the same time the vari-
ables xRS, yb, yc from zero. When z0 = 9/16 , the path hits the best response
region for the sequence L of player 1 in Figure 4.2 because the slack rL of the
payoff for that sequence becomes zero.
For any z0 , the current pair (x, y) of realization plans defined by (3.5) belongs to
X(z0)× Y (z0), the product of the restricted strategy sets defined by
X(z0) = { x̂ ∈ X | x̂σ ≥ pσz0 ∀σ ∈ S1 },
Y (z0) = { ŷ ∈ Y | ŷσ ≥ qσz0 ∀σ ∈ S2 }.
(4.2)
For z0 = 9/16 , the set Y (z0) is shown in Figure 4.2 as a square, a smaller sized
replica of the strategy space Y containing the starting point q in the same relative
position. The end of the arrow “1.” is the lower left corner y = y + qz0 of that
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square, where only the sequences b and c of player 2 have positive components yb
and yc and ya = yd = 0. Similarly, the end of the arrow “1.” in Figure 4.1 is the
corner x = x+ pz0 of X(z0) with xRS > 0 and xL = xRT = 0.
2. Since the slack rL has become zero, it is replaced by its complementary variable
xL that is now increased from zero, according to step (b) of Algorithm 3.3.
That is, rL has left and xL enters the basis. When xL is increased, then z0 can
neither decrease since this would make RS nonoptimal, nor increase since this
would make L nonoptimal (see Figure 4.2). So z0 remains unchanged. Since
b and c are still the unique best responses for player 2, his current position in
Y (z0) is unchanged, marked with “2.” (underlined) in Figure 4.2. For player 1,
the arrow “2.” in Figure 4.1 denotes an increase of xL along the boundary
of X(z0) until the best response set of the sequence a of player 2 is reached.
Then, the basic slack variable sa becomes zero and is exchanged with ya .
3. Since rL and rRS are nonbasic and zero, the next piece of the path in Figure 4.2
must belong to the best response regions for both L and RS . The relative size
of ya can only increase if z0 is increased, which shrinks the set Y (z0). By the
same shrinking factor, X(z0) becomes a smaller triangle in Figure 4.1, until
xRS becomes zero, which happens when z0 is increased to 60/77. Then the end
of the arrow “3.” points to the corner x = x+pz0 of X(z0) where xL is the only
positive component of x. The variable xRS leaves the basis and is replaced by
its complement rRS , so that in the next step, the path leaves the best response
region for RS in Figure 4.2.
4. Since ya, yb, yc are all basic, z0 remains constant and nothing changes for play-
er 1 in Figure 4.1. By increasing rRS from zero, ya is increased and yb decreased
until it is zero at the end of the arrow “4.” in Figure 4.2. Then yb is replaced
by its complement sb.
5. The current basis contains only xL, ya, yc , so the best response sequences are
L for player 1 and a and c for player 2. By increasing sb from zero, z0 is
decreased again until it is zero, reaching at the end of the arrow “5.” in both
figures the equilibrium (x, y) = (x, y) with xL = 1 and ya = yc = 1, which
terminates the algorithm.
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Observe that the starting vector (p, q) is used throughout the whole computation
for reference since it determines the system (3.4) and the sets X(z0) and Y (z0).
5. Perfect equilibria
Technically, our method is related to the algorithm by Koller, Megiddo, and von
Stengel (1996). Conceptually, it is based on the algorithm by van den Elzen and
Talman (1991) for the normal form. The mixed LCP with constraints (2.7) and
(2.8) can also be used to characterize the equilibria (x, y) of a game in normal form
with payoff matrices A and B . Then E and F each consist of a single row of ones
and e = f = 1, so that the strategy spaces X and Y in (2.5) are the mixed strategy
simplices. In that case, Lemke’s algorithm with the covering vector d in (3.3) is
equivalent to the algorithm by van den Elzen and Talman. This follows easily from
Lemma 3.1, but has not been observed before.
The main game-theoretic property of the van den Elzen—Talman algorithm for
the normal form is that the computed equilibrium is perfect whenever the starting
vector is completely mixed. This result carries over to the sequence form, as follows.
Call a realization plan x for player 1 (similarly y for player 2) completely mixed




, c ∈ Ch, h ∈ H1 . (5.1)
The behavior strategy β assigns positive probability to any choice c. Regarded
as a mixed strategy, β is therefore also completely mixed in the sense that every
pure strategy is played with positive probability. Conversely, any completely mixed
strategy defines a completely mixed realization plan by (2.2).
As shown in Lemma 2.2, the linear map defined by (2.2) maps the mixed strat-
egy simplices to the sequence form strategy spaces X and Y . The path computed
by Algorithm 3.3 is part of X×Y . A suitable pre-image of this path under the linear
map (2.2) yields a piecewise linear path in mixed strategies. We show this only for
player 1; the consideration for player 2 is analogous. Consider two endpoints x1 and
x2 in X of a line segment [x1, x2] of the computed path. These endpoints are defined
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by two successively computed bases. Let µ1 and µ2 be mixed strategies of player 1
that have realization plans x1 and x2 , respectively. In the mixed strategy simplex
of player 1, the line segment connecting µ1 and µ2 is mapped under (2.2) to [x1, x2]
since that map is linear. Thus, [x1, x2] is indeed the image of a line segment in
mixed strategies.
The particular pre-image of [x1, x2] in the mixed strategy simplex does not
matter, because mixed strategies with the same realization plans are realization
equivalent and therefore payoff equivalent. A canonical choice for µ1 and µ2 are the
corresponding behavior strategies of player 1 as in (5.1). Only the endpoints of the
line segment [x1, x2] should be translated to behavior strategies in this way, but not
every point on the segment since this does not yield a line in the mixed strategy
simplex if the convex combinations of µ1 and µ2 are not all behavior strategies.
Theorem 5.1: Let the starting vector (p, q) be completely mixed. Then Algo-
rithm 3.3 computes an equilibrium that is normal form perfect.
Proof: Let (x∗, y∗) be the computed equilibrium. Except for its endpoint
(x∗, y∗), the last line segment of the computed path consists of pairs (x+pz0, y + qz0)
of realization plans where z0 > 0, due to condition 3.3(c). Therefore, these real-
ization plans are, like p and q, completely mixed. The equilibrium (x∗, y∗) is the
limit of these realization plans when z0 goes to zero, and is a pair of best responses
to these realization plans because of the complementarity condition (2.8), since x∗
and y∗ have the same basic components as x and y (a similar argument is made
in the proof of Lemma 3.2). These properties hold also when the computed path
is translated to mixed strategies as described above. According to Selten (1975,
Thm. 7), they imply that the equilibrium (x∗, y∗) is perfect in the normal form.
Any point (x, y) on the computed path is an equilibrium of the game with the
restricted strategy sets X(z0) for player 1 and Y (z0) for player 2 in (4.2), where any
nonoptimal sequence σ has the minimum probability pσz0 for player 1 and qσz0 for
player 2. In the final computation step when z0 goes to zero, these can be considered
as mistake probabilities so that the equilibrium is “trembling hand” perfect. The
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equilibrium is perfect for the normal form but not necessarily for the extensive form
(see van Damme, 1987, p. 114).
The relative mistake probabilities for sequences are as in the starting vector
(p, q), so they can be varied. The algorithm by Wilson (1992) for a game in normal
form computes also a perfect equilibrium, but with mistake probabilities for pure
strategies that have different orders of magnitude, according to an initially chosen
order of the pure strategies.
Another game-theoretic property of our algorithm is that it mimics the linear
tracing procedure by Harsanyi and Selten (1988), applied to the normal form of the
game. Thereby, the starting vector (p, q) is the players’ prior which the players take
into account with probability z0 , whereas 1 − z0 is the probability for the current
strategy pair (x∗, y∗) defined in (3.6). For further details see van den Elzen and
Talman (1999).
6. Degeneracy resolution
The support of a mixed strategy is the set of pure strategies it uses with positive
probability. A game is called degenerate if the number of pure best responses to
some mixed strategy exceeds the size of its support (this is the simplest of many
equivalent definitions, see von Stengel, 2000). Degeneracy can also be defined for
augmented linear systems like (3.4) and for the sequence form, where it means that
certain basic solutions have basic variables with value zero. Then the leaving variable
in a pivoting step may be not unique and must be determined by an additional (for
example lexicographic) rule that guarantees termination of the algorithm.
A bimatrix game is nondegenerate with probability one if its payoffs are generic,
that is, drawn independently from continuous distributions. The normal form of an
extensive game, however, is often degenerate even if payoffs are generic. The reason
is that there may be many best response strategies specifying choices in unreached
parts of the game tree. This holds also for the sequence form, even though it is
less redundant than the normal form. For example, the game in Figure 2.1 has the
equilibrium (x, y) in realization plans with xL = 1, ya = yc = 1. Here the sequence d
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of player 2 is also a best response but has probability zero, so both the slack variable
sd and its complement yd have value zero, one of which is a basic variable. This
degeneracy is due to the structure of the game tree and not due to the payoffs, since
after the choice L of player 1, the second information set of player 2 with its choices
c and d is unreached. In larger games, such degeneracies can also be observed at
intermediate steps of the computation.
In our algorithm, degeneracy is handled by the well-known lexicographic method
as follows (for a detailed exposition see Koller, Megiddo, and von Stengel, 1996). In
a pivoting step, the leaving variable is determined by a minimum ratio test applied
to the right hand side of the current tableau divided by the positive entries of the
entering column. In a nondegenerate game, the minimum is unique. Otherwise, the
set of candidates for the leaving variable is tested again by comparing the ratios for
the next column of the tableau, until a unique minimum is found. Our computational
experiments show that many, sometimes even all relevant tableau columns must be
iteratively tested in this way. This makes it mandatory to use exact arithmetic (see
Section 9 below) in order to verify the pivoting “ties” reliably. The lexicographic
rule determines the leaving variable and the computed path uniquely. Hence, no
basis is repeated and the algorithm terminates.
In the computation described in Section 4, the final pivoting step where z0
leaves the basis is degenerate since the variable sd could leave as well. According
to step (c) of Algorithm 3.3, z0 is chosen to leave the basis. According to the
lexicographic rule, sd would leave the basis, with yd entering and then rRS leaving
and xRS entering, and finally z0 leaving the basis. This determines the equilibrium
(x, y) with xL = 1, ya = 1, yc = 1/12 (see von Stengel et al., 1996). Koller, Megiddo,
and von Stengel (1996) showed that the lexicographic rule guarantees termination
of the algorithm, even without testing before if z0 can leave the basis. The above
example shows that the extra test for z0 can shorten the computation, which was an
open question. Recall that in Algorithm 3.3(c), the variable z0 leaves the basis as
soon as possible in order to obtain a normal form perfect equilibrium by Theorem 5.1.
The lexicographic rule maintains the invariant that all computed bases are
lexico-positive, so this must also hold for the initial basis. The simplest initialization
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for Algorithm 3.3 is to start Lemke’s algorithm in a first phase with artificial slack
variables that are complementary to u and v. The components of u and v are
then brought into the basis using the lexicographic rule, and never leave again. For
details see von Stengel et al. (1996).
7. Homotopy and equilibria with negative index
The presented algorithm can be viewed as a homotopy method. The homotopy
principle unifies a number of algorithms (see Garcia and Zangwill, 1981, in particular
p. 368 for Lemke’s algorithm). In our case, the original system (2.7), (2.8) that
defines an equilibrium is relaxed to (3.4), (2.8) by admitting the extra variable z0 .
The solutions to the augmented system form a one-dimensional set. With suitable
lexicographic perturbation to avoid degeneracies, this set is a one-dimensional mani-
fold, a collection of paths that do not fork. The endpoints of these paths are the
equilibria of the game, with the exception of a trivial solution (for z0 = 1) given by
the starting vector. This is exploited algorithmically by considering first the trivial
solution and then — in the usual view of a homotopy — “deforming” the system until
it represents the original system (for z0 = 0) with the desired solution.
The homotopy parameter z0 is not always changed monotonically since the
decrease of z0 often stalls and may even be temporarily reversed while the path is
traversed, as in step 3 in our example. On the other hand, the non-monotonicity of
the homotopy makes it globally convergent and therefore superior to optimization
techniques that tend to work only locally.
The endpoints of the homotopy paths have opposite index, an invariant of the
equilibrium (see, for example, Govindan and Wilson, 1997). The equilibrium at the
end of the path that begins at the starting vector has always positive index (Garcia
and Zangwill, 1981, p. 54). If the game has several equilibria, any equilibrium of
positive index can be found from a starting vector that is close enough (although
this might not be a practical way to find all equilibria). The equilibria of negative
index can then be found by the following modification of Algorithm 3.3. Suppose
two positively indexed equilibria (x, y) and (x0, y0) have been traced from the start-
ing vectors (p, q) and (p0, q0), respectively. Then the homotopy system (3.4), (2.8)
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induced by (p, q) has a path with (x0, y0) at one end and a negatively indexed e-
quilibrium at the other end, since (x0, y0) is not the equilibrium connected to (p, q).
Then that negatively indexed equilibrium is found by considering the system defined
by (p, q) with its initial solution (x0, y0) and z0 = 0, and then letting z0 increase and
continuing step (b) of Algorithm 3.3 until z0 leaves again the basis with value zero.
In our example, a second positively indexed equilibrium (x0, y0) is given by
x0 = (xL, xRS, xRT ) = (0, 1/3, 2/3) and y0 = (ya, yb, yc, yd) = (0, 1, 2/3, 1/3) which is
found when starting from p0 = (3/10, 7/20, 7/20) and q0 = (1/8, 7/8, 1/3, 2/3), for example.
Then the algorithm proceeds from the initial solution (x0, y0) and z0 = 0 as follows.
1. The basic variables are rL, xRS , xRT , sa, yb, yc , yd . The entering variable z0 is
increased to 3/8 , where the slack variable rL becomes zero and leaves the basis.
2. The entering variable xL is increased to 137/560 , where sa becomes zero and
leaves. No change occurs for z0 and y.
3. The entering variable ya is increased until ya = 1/8 where z0 = 0. Then z0 leaves
the basis. The algorithm terminates with the negatively indexed equilibrium
x = (5/14, 3/14, 3/7) and y = (1/8, 7/8, 2/3, 1/3).
8. Comparison with other algorithms
A number of existing algorithms compute an equilibrium of a two-person game
using the normal form. The classical algorithm by Lemke and Howson (1964) starts
from a pure strategy pair where only one of the pure strategies is a best response
to the other, and follows a path by complementary pivoting until the nonoptimal
strategy either becomes optimal or has probability zero. Wilson (1992) extended this
algorithm with a lexicographic method so that the computed equilibrium is perfect.
By shifting the lexicographic order among the pure strategies and continuing the
path suitably, the computed equilibrium also fulfills a variant of stability.
Wilson (1972) applied the Lemke—Howson algorithm to the normal form of an
extensive game, which is stored only for the — ideally small — support of the current
mixed strategies. Only the pure strategies in this support are stored explicitly as
tuples of choices. These pure strategies are computed by a subroutine that works
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directly on the game tree. This subroutine is called, possibly many times, for each
pivoting step in order to determine the leaving variable, which is in general not part
of the current support (Wilson, 1972, p. 452).
The algorithm by van den Elzen and Talman (1991) computes a perfect e-
quilibrium when started in the interior of the strategy space. In contrast to the
Lemke—Howson algorithm, its starting point can be chosen freely.
The pivoting algorithms by Lemke and Howson (1964), Wilson (1992), and
van den Elzen and Talman (1991) all use the normal form of the game. Because
each pivoting step updates the entire matrix which is exponentially large compared
to the game tree, this becomes exceedingly slow for larger games. The algorithms
of Wilson (1972, 1992) could be combined to compute a perfect equilibrium for a
game in extensive form, in order to exploit the possible sparsity of mixed strategies
in extensive games (see Koller and Megiddo, 1996). However, that algorithm is still
slow because of a large number of subroutine calls in each pivoting step, and has
other difficulties (see von Stengel, van den Elzen, and Talman, 1997). Hence, our
algorithm is substantially faster than these normal form algorithms.
The algorithm by Koller, Megiddo, and von Stengel (1996) is Lemke’s algorithm
based on the sequence form. In comparison to that method, our algorithm has
the following advantages. Our convergence proof is straightforward because the
path remains in the strategy space which precludes ray termination. The proof in
Koller, Megiddo, and von Stengel (1996) is very technical. Most importantly, we
can freely choose the starting vector, and that choice has a clear interpretation. In
consequence, our algorithm can find several equilibria if they exist. Moreover, the
computed equilibrium is normal form perfect if the starting vector is completely
mixed.
9. Computational experiments
We have implemented our algorithm and compared it with the algorithm by van
den Elzen and Talman (1991) for the normal form, applied to the same extensive
game and to the same behavior strategy that defines the starting vector. This gives
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the most direct comparison between sequence form and reduced normal form. We
chose a class of games where many choices in a strategy can be left unspecified since
they are irrelevant (as one would typically expect), making the reduced normal
form seemingly quite tractable. The computational efficiency of the sequence form
therefore does not manifest itself until the game trees have several hundred nodes.
Shortly thereafter, however, the reduced normal form “explodes” in size and cannot
even be tested for comparison. We have investigated such large games using the
sequence form only, which is still solved within several minutes. The relatively short
computation times are due to the use of integer pivoting (see Shapley, 1987, and
Chvàtal, 1983, p. 444). The program was written in C and run on a 400 MHz
Pentium.
The games we consider are binary trees with L choices along any path from the
root to a leaf, where player 1 moves I times and player 2 moves J times, L = I+J .
The players alternate, player 1 moving first, so that I = J = L/2 if L is even, and
I = (L+1)/2 and J = (L−1)/2 if L is odd. The game has no chance moves. At each
decision node, the player has two choices and is informed about all previous choices
except the immediately preceding choice by the other player. Every information set
of the game (except the one containing the tree root) therefore has two nodes, and
the game has no subgames. The game tree has 2L leaves and 2L+1 − 1 nodes in
total. Player 1 has (4I + 2)/6 and player 2 has (4J − 1)/3 information sets, each
with two choices. The players’ payoffs are random integers between 1 and 100. Each
tree depth L is studied with up to 100 different random payoffs.
The reduced normal form of such a game is substantially smaller than the
unreduced normal form. Whenever a player chooses “left”, say, at an information
set, then all information sets following the unused choice “right” are irrelevant,
which are half of the information sets at later stages. On the other hand, for any
information set h of player 1, say, there is a parallel information set h0 (that is,
σh = σh0 ) as soon as player 2 has moved at least twice, since then player 1 is
informed about the second-to-last choice of player 2. (The same holds with players
interchanged.) In any reduced strategy where h and h0 are relevant, all combinations
of choices at h and h0 must be considered, as well as combinations of subsequently
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possible choices. The latter property leads to a multiplicative growth of reduced
strategies. It is not hard to prove that in a game with tree depth L = I + J as
described above, player 1 has 22
(I−1)
and player 2 has 2(2
J−1) reduced strategies.
These numbers are shown in Table 9.1.
tree depth L 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
tree leaves 8 16 32 64 128 256 512
tree nodes N 15 31 63 127 255 511 1023
move depth I player 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5
move depth J player 2 1 2 2 3 3 4 4
strategies player 1 4 4 16 16 256 256 65536
strategies player 2 2 8 8 128 128 32768 32768
LCP dimension RNF 8 14 26 146 386 33026 98306
sequences player 1 7 7 23 23 87 87 343
constraints player 1 4 4 12 12 44 44 172
sequences player 2 3 11 11 43 43 171 171
constraints player 2 2 6 6 22 22 86 86
LCP dimension SF 16 28 52 100 196 388 772
games tested 100 100 100 100 100∗ 20 10
starting vectors tested 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
RNF computing time [sec] 0.001 0.003 0.017 0.71 25.4 — —
RNF pivoting steps 6.6 8.0 10.0 14.8 20.5 — —
SF computing time [sec] 0.003 0.017 0.142 0.89 6.0 49.8 464.3
SF pivoting steps 14.6 25.2 45.8 94.1 191.8 397.6 983.8
equilibria per game 1.2 2.0 4.4 16.6 44.2 84.3 98.9
equilibrium outcomes 1.2 1.5 2.5 4.2 7.0 13.7 22.4
Table 9.1.–Data for binary game tree with depth L and two-element information
sets as studied in computational experiments. The observed data are
averages. ∗RNF only tested for 20 games.
In terms of the size of the game tree, the number of reduced strategies is given
as follows. When L is odd, then player 1 has twice as many reduced strategies as
player 2, namely 22
J
where I = J + 1, L = 2J + 1 (when L is even, the number
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of strategies of player 2 is increasingly disproportionate to that of player 1, e.g. 231
compared to 216 when L = 10). Then the game tree has N = 2L+1 = 22J+2 (minus
one) many nodes, so that
√
N = 2J+1, which shows that player 1 has 2
√
N/2 many
strategies. In practical terms, the exponential “explosion” happens when J = 4
since 215 many strategies for player 2 make the reduced normal form too large to be
processed with a pivoting method.
The reduced normal form (RNF) is solved by the van den Elzen—Talman algo-
rithm. As mentioned at the beginning of Section 5, this is the same as our method
except that the constraints Ex = e and Fy = f each consist of a single equation to









. For the sequence form (SF), the number of sequences and constraints (the
number of equations in Ex = e and Fy = f , which is the number of the player’s
information sets plus one) give an LCP dimension of about 3
4
N .
Each game is solved with 100 different starting vectors. One of these is the
“centroid”, that is, the behavior strategy where all choices have equal probability.
The other starting vectors are behavior strategies with a random behavior at each
information set, which is a probability vector chosen from the uniform distribution
on the respective unit simplex. Here, each information set has only two choices, so
the probability for one choice is just uniformly chosen from the unit interval, and
the other choice gets the complementary probability. (It is less straightforward but
possible to implement a uniform distribution on the respective higher-dimensional
simplex when an information set has more than two choices.) For game trees of
depth L ≤ 6, each of the 100 games resulting from different payoffs is tested with
100 different starting vectors, so that running times are averaged over 10,000 com-
putations. For L = 7, 8, and 9, the sequence form is applied to 100, 20, and 10
different games, respectively, each with 100 starting vectors. The number of games
does not seem to be critical — already 10 games for each level lead to very similar
computation times. For L = 7, the normal form computation takes too long and is
applied only to 20 games, that is, 2,000 times in total. For L ≥ 8, the normal form
is too large even to store the LCP matrix.
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The computed equilibria for the reduced normal form and for the sequence form
almost always agree, as predicted in Section 5. A rare exception are games where the
lexicographic rule, which depends on the arbitrary order of LCP variables, resolves
a “bifurcation” of the computed path differently, for example when two choices lead
to equal payoffs.
The reduced normal form requires much fewer pivoting steps (see Table 9.1)
since one step changes a strategy and thus several choices at a time. In contrast,
the sequence form requires a larger number of pivoting steps (roughly the same as
the LCP dimension) since these change only one choice at a time. Curiously, the
number of pivoting steps is always odd . We have not yet explained this observation,
which is not true for the Lemke—Howson algorithm, for example.
Computation times for the sequence form break about even with the reduced
normal form when L = 6. Then, the larger number of pivoting steps for the sequence
form is outbalanced by the smaller time needed to perform a pivoting step in a
smaller and sparser tableau. Computation times for the reduced normal form are
also more variable. The longest computation for L = 6 took 15.0 seconds (average
0.71, standard deviation 0.68) compared to maximally 5.4 seconds for the sequence
form (average 0.89, standard deviation 0.41).
Table 9.1 shows that doubling the size N of the game tree incurs an approxi-
mately eightfold increase of the computation time for the sequence form (the small
number of levels investigated allows only for a rough estimate in this regard). Em-
pirically, the running time is therefore cubic in the input size (proportional to N3
for a game tree with N nodes). Since the number of pivoting steps seems to be
proportional to N , each step takes time proportional to N2 . The tableau itself is
sparse, but the numbers involved have a larger number of digits with increasing N
which slows the computation down. This is due to the use of arbitrary precision
integer arithmetic, which is necessary since Lemke’s algorithm with standard float-
ing point arithmetic is numerically unstable (Tomlin, 1978). For comparison, the
simplex algorithm for linear programming applied to a zero-sum game requires in
practice also proportional to N many pivoting steps for an LP with N constraints
(Chvàtal 1983, p. 45). The only difference to our method is that good implemen-
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tations of the simplex method are numerically stable even with limited-precision
floating point arithmetic, and therefore faster for larger zero-sum games.
As the games increase in size, a larger number of equilibria is found when vary-
ing the starting vector (for L = 8 and L = 9, almost every different starting vector
leads to a different equilibrium, so that one should try more than 100 starting vec-
tors here). As soon as a player can move several times during play, many of these
equilibria differ only in choices away from the equilibrium path, as demonstrated by
the last row in Table 9.1 that shows the number of distinct equilibrium outcomes,
that is, distributions on tree leaves induced by equilibria. The support of an equi-
librium outcome tends to be small. Most equilibria are in pure strategies or involve
only very few information sets where a player mixes his moves. This observation
— without analyzing it further — holds presumably because the game has random
payoffs. At the tree sizes where the sequence form becomes relevant, it is hopeless to
enumerate all equilibria since enumeration is exponential in the LCP dimension (see
also Gilboa and Zemel, 1989). However, we have not tried to find as many equilibria
as possible, or to find negatively indexed equilibria according to Section 7.
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